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When people say, “My candidate lies, and I am betrayed” in the sense I’m thinking of, they don’t then go on to say, “but they told me what I wanted to hear so they are more moral/honest/whatever.” These people become disillusioned…they feel NAIVE for having listened to what they wanted to hear and actually thought it could happen. They become disaffected from the process.

I think that is the honesty value popping up over loyalty.

Now, they might say that one candidate is more moral than the other, but then it’s from a “lesser of two evils” effect. I see a LOT of that in politics nowadays…so I don’t think it necessarily goes against an honesty moral foundation. It’s just that people are coming to terms with an idea that everything is rotten out there.

Re 33: chanson, I think the whistleblower is a good representative of what an integrity moral value would represent. When you listen to people who *didn’t* blow the whistle or were apprehensive, they will often say things like, “But I didn’t want to start trouble…” or “I wanted things to go smoothly…” which seems more of a preference for the loyalty foundation as well

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I missed your previous comment. You almost have me convinced… but I’ve seen too many instances, in politics, business dealings, etc. where judgements regarding honesty are not applied equally and logically–one person gets a pass and another doesn’t. I like your whistleblower example, but I don’t know if it is that clearcut.

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Mentally, I think people want to value honesty. In practice, it often takes the back seat.

Right, but with all of the values, there are conflicts and people have to decide among them. For example, a whistle-blower may value honesty over group loyalty, whereas his colleague who said nothing may have chosen loyalty over honesty.

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I think you have a point in an individual person having a gut response to lying themselves–but how does that same person respond to the [white] lies told by another? I won’t comment on that further because I’d just be retreading the discussion above. If honesty/integrity had a place on the moral spectrum, I would place in with purity/sanctity (a non-physical dimension of that morality). In general, I don’t think it plays out quite that way, especially when judging others. We seem to be agreed that the heart and the head are not always in accord.

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After thinking about this more, I think inclusiveness/expansiveness fits into fairness/reciprocity (with a nod to ingroup/loyalty).

I’m kind of leaning towards this impression as well.

Totally correct me if I have the wrong impression, but it seems to me that Haidt is basing the moralities on what people actually do; some of the discussion here seems to be on what should be valued–I’m primarily thinking of the honesty/integrity suggestion. Mentally, people say they value integrity but emotionally, or, in practice, I am doubtful. Some people feel more honest than others; with investigation, I don’t know how much those feelings are based in reality.At the least, I would place honesty/integrity as how well someone fits into your overall particlar moral scheme: a person who fits your overall morality is perceived as being honest and having integrity.

Call me crazy, but I think that many people really do value honesty, and aren’t just thinking “whoever says what I want to believe must be the most honest.” Even if the truth is slippery and things can always be presented in more than one way, there’s a difference between having the intention of presenting things clearly and accurately vs. trying to dissemble. You perceive that some people seem more honest than others, maybe they are.

If everyone says they value honesty, and some seem to do it, it would make sense for Haight to consider it. It’s almost kind of ironic to dismiss it by saying “Sure everyone claims to value integrity, but I’m sure they’re all just lying to themselves…”

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The thing is, can honesty/integrity sometimes be something that people *emotionally* value? I mean, it’s so cynical to say that in practice, it doesn’t happen. You can easily imagine some people who get sick to their stomachs telling what they know even to be a little white lie.

as you kinda get at, it’s that the very idea of ‘truth’ *is* slippery. Obviously, believers are going to, in good faith, believe that the religion is true. Nonbelievers are going to, in good faith, believe that the religion is not true. So both parties could, in good faith, claim to have an emotional response for integrity or truth. The distinction isn’t necessarily in objective truths (e.g., this candidate or that, this belief or that one), but in…when the held belief is compromised, which people still rationalize and “accept” these compromises and which people have a problem with it.

So, we see some people who will say, “Well, this candidate lied, but they were good lies.” On the other hand, others will say, “My candidate lied; I am betrayed.”

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After thinking about this more, I think inclusiveness/expansiveness fits into fairness/reciprocity (with a nod to ingroup/loyalty). Including people is a part of being fair, it seems to me. But to some, part of ingroup/loyalty is sacrificing or conforming to be part of the group: fairness is including others and fairness also is expecting others to conform in order to be included. It isn’t really fair, in my mind, because some have to conform more that others, but I see where other people would find this a fair situation. These moralities play out differently for different people.

One of Haidt’s examples is with patriotism (an aspect of ingroup/loyalty). Some people say it is patriotic to not question the President, especially in a time of war. Other people say it is patriotic and loyal to question the President. So two people could equally value ingroup/loyalty, and yet, to each other they would seem immoral (I believe someone already suggested an analagous scenario).

Totally correct me if I have the wrong impression, but it seems to me that Haidt is basing the moralities on what people actually do; some of the discussion here seems to be on what should be valued–I’m primarily thinking of the honesty/integrity suggestion. Mentally, people say they value integrity but emotionally, or, in practice, I am doubtful. Some people feel more honest than others; with investigation, I don’t know how much those feelings are based in reality. At the least, I would place honesty/integrity as how well someone fits into your overall particlar moral scheme: a person who fits your overall morality is perceived as being honest and having integrity.

My reason for thinking this way, in part: I’ve had people tell me that one candidate had more integrity, or was more moral than the other, but they were unable to tell me why and in fact, would end up saying that the more moral candidate told the right lies! We might want honesty to matter, but does it?

I suppose some of what I’m talking about could be explained by the notion of brand, image: once someone has been convinced that a person or party has an image of morality or integrity, the image sticks almost regardless of future events. Does any of this make sense?

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But lots of times these values can come into conflict. So instead of saying that some people don’t value moral foundation X, there’s the question of how they rank the foundation morals.

For example, I value honesty, but would not hesitate to lie in order to prevent an innocent person from being found and lynched by an angry mob. So maybe some researcher would say that I value care/harm over truth/integrity. But, as you point out, some are willing to fudge a little for the Lord (and some aren’t) which would indicate (to me) that they have an inclination to place in-group loyalty and/or respect for authority above truth/integrity, which I wouldn’t be willing to do.

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